Monday, May 12, 2014

Barclay's Epiphany is Long Overdue


Roy C. Smith

The market warmly welcomed Barclays’ announcement on May 8th that it was going to slash the headcount and risk-weighted assets of its investment bank. Its stock price rose 7% on the news.  
It was about time. Barclays’ 2009 acquisition of the US business of Lehman Brothers proved to be a bridge-to-far that destroyed shareholder value and left the bank with an unstable business model.
Barclays ranked 5th on a 2013 list of global capital market leaders by origination of transactions. But membership in this elite group proved to be very expensive for Barclays, whose commitment to capital markets after the Lehman acquisition was too much for it to manage, and too heavily dependent on fixed income, currencies and commodities.
Its decision to back down from investment banking will mean that it will probably disappear from the top ten list and there will no longer be any UK owned bank among the market leaders, even though the market is still centered in London.
Of course, Barclays, like all its global banking peers, never expected the investment banking business to be so difficult over such a long period – five years -- nor did it fully appreciate the extent of the aggregate regulatory burden that would be imposed on it, or the costs of legal settlements and reputation damage that it would incur.
These factors have largely destroyed the economic viability of the global capital market business model. Since 2009, the leading banks, on average, have failed to earn their cost of capital, with eight or nine of the top ten banks each year generating negative EVA (economic valued added, or ROI less the cost of equity capital).


A Need to Change Strategies
For the past few years it has been fairly obvious that the global investment banks would have to change their business models significantly to adjust to the times.
Citigroup and Morgan Stanley were the first to act with the sale of Citi’s Smith Barney retail brokerage business to Morgan Stanley. Though mainly a downsizing act for Citigroup, which left its large investment banking unit intact, it reflected a major strategy change for Morgan Stanley, which diluted its investment banking exposure by the addition of one of the world’s largest retail businesses.
Morgan Stanley’s revised strategy has still not produced a positive EVA, but over the past two years its stock price has risen 125%, more than any of its US investment banking competitors.
The next to move were Credit Suisse and UBS, both of which announced a Barclay’s like downsizing of investment banking a year ago. While UBS dropped in the global investment banking league tables to 9th position in 2013 (and may drop out of the top ten in the future), its stock price outperformed its European peers in the last year. Both banks, however, are still posting negative EVA.
Frozen in Place
But several of the global investment banks, though maintaining market share, were well out of favor. The stocks of Barclays, Citigroup, Bank of America, and Deutsche Bank traded at an average of 72% of book on March 31, 2014 and their average EVA was minus 7.8%. These banks have focused on cost cutting and eliminating non-core businesses, but have not moved to reduce their dependence on investment banking, which amounts to about half their profits. To them, the investment banking units are too important to dismantle; to investors these banks seem locked into a business model that is neither working, not viable.
Barclay’s actions seek to break the ice and return it to “normal,” which will mean concentrating on UK retail and commercial banking. 
Deutsche Bank, trading at a miserable 59% of book value and -5.2% EVA, needs to do something dramatic to free itself – possibly spinning off its London based investment bank to the bank’s shareholders.
For Citigroup and Bank of America, however, “normal” is increasing beginning to look like Wells Fargo, a growing and profitable basic-banking franchise in the US.
The New Normal Bank
Wells Fargo, with a market capitalization of $259 billion at March 31, 2014, is the world’s most valuable bank. It trades at 1.7 times book value and has an EVA of +4.4%. It finances 71% of its balance sheet (which is almost a trillion dollars smaller than JP Morgan’s) with deposits, and pays out 55% of profits in dividends and stock repurchases. Citi and Bank of America (after its reset) payout only about 1%.
Wells Fargo increased its syndicated lending activity in 2013, and landed in 10th place in the capital market origination table for the first time with only 13% of its revenues from investment banking sources.  Its share may rise further as other banks follow Barclays, UBS and Credit Suisse out of the market.
Citi’s and Bank of America’s shareholders ought to be asking “why can’t we be normal like that?”

Monday, April 28, 2014

Bank of America’s Real Surprises




Roy C. Smith

An accounting mistake reveals how questionable bank financial reporting has come to be, and how weak two of our largest banks still are.

Earlier today Bank of America announced that, due to a material accounting error going back to 2009, it was cancelling its long sought four cents per share quarterly dividend increase and $4 billion stock buyback plan. The Federal Reserve only recently approved this payout plan after its 2013 Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) of Bank of America’s capital position.
The event calls attention to the extraordinary complexity of bank financial reporting and its dubious value for important regulatory or investment purposes.  Always voluminous, Bank of America’s annual report had 141 pages of financial statements in 2007, and but 257 in 2013, reflecting new disclosures imposed since the crisis.  So much data is bound to contain errors or need correcting from time to time. In any event, it is more than even skilled investment analysts or regulators can process
The event may also be an additional argument for why the Fed should emphasize “qualitative considerations” in assessing a bank’s overall financial position, as it did in its recent rejection of Citigroup’s plan to return capital to its shareholders after meeting the quantitative requirements of its CCAR.
But it also reminds us that both Bank of America and Citigroup continue to be economic basket cases, six years after the crisis. Without government assistance, (since repaid) both banks would have failed.  But neither bank is out of the woods, even now.
Bank of America recently reported another quarterly loss, its fourth such since 2010. Both it and Citigroup reported returns on equity for the first quarter of 2014 approximately 13% less than their costs of equity capital, and both of their shares trade at 72% of book value despite a significant rise over the last 2 years. 
Both banks have failed to cover their cost of capital, and have traded well below book value, for the last 21 quarters.
Both have bond ratings from Moody’s of Baa2, lower than all of their peers.
Both banks also pale in comparison to their biggest national banking competitor, Wells Fargo, the most valuable financial services firm in the US with a market capitalization of $260 billion. Wells Fargo reported a return on equity 4.65% greater than its cost of equity capital for the 1Q2014 period, and trades at 1.6 times book value.  Its dividend and stock buyback payout ratio is 55%, compared to 1% for both Bank of America (after the announcement) and Citigroup. 
Wells Fargo is not hampered by an extensive and difficult to manage commitment to trading and investment banking. Citicorp’s acquisition by Travelers in 1998 put it into these businesses (through Salomon Bros., previously acquired by Travelers), and Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch in 2008, along with the endlessly toxic Countrywide Financial.
It may be that neither Bank of America nor Citi will be able to get back to “normal” until they shed (or greatly diminish) their investment banking businesses and refocus themselves on a consumer and commercial banking business model more like Wells Fargo’s.