Tuesday, April 8, 2014

How to Prevent Bad Bankers from Ruining Your Corporate Culture



By Ingo Walter
Nov. 13, 2013, The American Banker

JPMorgan Chase's $13 billion regulatory settlement is the latest case of banking indigestion attributable to long-tail liabilities stemming from practices almost a decade old.

Five years following the crisis, banks like JPMorgan are painfully adapting to new rules of the game designed to make the system more robust. The inevitable costs are being passed along to customers and long-suffering shareholders. One can hope the high tuition pays off down the road in better financial stability.

Still, memories are short. A growing shadow banking system, new products, persistent regulatory fault lines and renewed erosion of due diligence in some markets shows the persistent need for vigilance. Meanwhile, banks have been called on the carpet for an amazing variety of transgressions that encompass fixing Libor and foreign exchange benchmarks, aiding and abetting money laundering and tax evasion, rigging metals and energy markets and an assortment of fiduciary and consumer protection abuses.

Most of these allegations are independent of the crisis legacy, and have surfaced despite what were thought to be adequate legal and regulatory safeguards. All of them first came to light at individual banks. But most of them later turned out to be industry practice.

Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England, among others, has suggested we look to "cultural" factors in modern banking to prevent these and other missteps. Banking culture is a product of individuals who act collectively in a firm that operates under a combination of market discipline and regulatory constraints. In turn, banks comprise multiple subcultures that range from transactions processing and retail banking to corporate finance and interprofessional trading – subcultures that are distinctive in terms of the professionals they attract and the performance pressure to which they are exposed.  Financial markets can sometimes be so efficient that overstepping the rules offers one of the few routes to serious profit. As they say, "no conflict, no interest."

The choices bankers make probably has a lot to do with the raw material that forms the immediate culture within which people work – together with a "superculture" that sets the tone for the whole firm.

There is no reason to believe that people who choose banking as a profession are any more or less responsible than the population at large after adjusting for education, age, experience and other factors. But they have chosen to join an exceptional industry that works with other people's money and features exceptional fiduciary demands.

No doubt the vast majority of bankers meet the implied fitness and properness requisites. But more than a few evidently do not. Taken together, the record suggests there's a significant subgroup that is attracted to the banking industry as a unique fast-track route to exceptional income and wealth, one that is rarely open to peers in engineering, medicine and (except for a infinitesimally small cohort) science and technology. Unlike these high-performance professions, some parts of banking have enabled large and immediate personal rewards that effectively derive from wealth-redistribution rather than wealth-creation.
Supply and demand for financial talent seem to meet in tight-knit banking subcultures that populate hypercompetitive markets, in which the temptation to trespass on off-limits regulatory or behavioral territory is palpable and self-reinforcing, within banks, chat rooms and the high job mobility between firms. Per a classic e-mail between two traders, "What's the worst that could happen? We make $200 million and then we get fired."

The result? Potentially toxic subcultures reinforced by earnings pressure from senior management and gaps in defenses – the risk and compliance controls that tend to operate at an inherent disadvantage and often seem underinvested. And when things go seriously wrong, the collateral damage spreads to lots of innocent colleagues, clients, shareholders and taxpayers.

Adverse selection suggests that banking may be attracting more than its fair share of people who end up in the wrong business for the wrong reasons and create the wrong cultures. There is plenty of scope for problematic professional conduct that turns out to be industry practice, but there also seems to be scope for firms that get in trouble and those that don't.

What next? Here are some options: Tougher due diligence on who gets to do what in banking businesses that are prone to conflicts of interest and compliance issues. Biometric testing has been suggested, only half in jest. Zero-tolerance telegraphed by senior management and boards who walk the talk. Authorities can target civil and criminal enforcement actions on the specific individuals involved (those closest to the action) instead of those farthest away (shareholders).
Firms can introduce compensation schemes that handcuff bankers to the future financial performance of their firm (already well advanced at most banks). Boards should be willing to leave on the table some incremental financial performance to achieve reduced regulatory and reputational risk, admittedly a tough balance to execute. None of this is easy, and there are no free lunches. Hard to prove, but the payoff could be handsome indeed.

Monday, April 7, 2014

What is the Fed Up to with the Citigroup Rejection?

What is the Fed Up to with the Citigroup Rejection?


By Roy C. Smith
from eFinancialNews
April 7, 2014

For the past week an outraged Citigroup board of directors has been asking, “Why is the Fed picking on us?

“We are no longer the overly-aggressive, run-amuck bank we were in the past. We’ve totally changed our board, replaced our CEO twice, shrunk our balance sheet by 20% by selling off $700 billion of non-core assets (including a large, well loved brokerage business), laid off 50,000 employees, reduced leverage from 18.5 times equity at its peak in 2007 to 10 times today, increased deposits as a percent of assets from 38% to 51%, and restored $13.7 billion of profits. No other major US bank has restructured itself since the crisis as much as we have.”

The question comes after the Federal Reserve’s unexpected rejection of Citigroup’s plan to increase dividends and buy back some stock following its annual bank stress test. The bank also failed a similar stress test in 2012, an event that helped engineer the replacement of Vikram Pandit by Michael Corbat. This time, however, Citigroup’s under-stress capital ratios were well above minimums and exceeded those of its peers.

Being allowed to boost its quarterly dividend and repurchase some stock, were key short-term goals of the new Citigroup management team. All of the peers passed the tests, and were allowed to increase dividends.

So why did the Fed fail only Citigroup -- for “qualitative” reasons -- and deny its request for a modest increase in quarterly dividends (to five cents a share, from one cent)?

The Fed isn’t saying. It has muttered something about failings in Citi’s capital planning procedures and some unsatisfied past deficiencies. It has promised a full report in the future, but it doesn’t have to explain itself fully nor is it likely to do so.

Citigroup, after all, was the Fed’s biggest mistake of the modern banking era. It approved the merger of Citicorp into Travelers Insurance in 1998, which was illegal at the time (the Glass Steagall law that separated banking, investment banking and insurance was still in effect) without wondering what the complex new entity would use its powers to do or how it would be managed. The merger set up the repeal of Glass-Steagall a year later, which the Fed, under Alan Greenspan, endorsed enthusiastically.

Citigroup immediately became very aggressive, plunging itself into financing the technology bubble of the late 1990s. Citi’s subsequent loan losses, fines and legal settlements from this period consumed about half its investment banking profits for the five years through 2003. The NY State Attorney General forced the removal of Sandy Weill, Citigroup’s CEO and “founder,” after misconduct allegations in 2003. Its $13 billion “Doctor Evil” bond rigging scheme infuriated regulators in Europe in 2004. It was also one of the first big banks to fall in with mortgage-backed securities, parking them creatively in special off-balance sheet investment vehicles in London. All of this occurred under the not-so watchful eye of the Fed, its principal regulator.

Citigroup was the first major US bank to collapse in 2008, requiring more than $45 billion in federal bailout assistance (during the crisis it wrote off $143 billion, more than all of the $121 billion of capital it had in 2007). For several years it was the poster child for both bad bank management and faulty bank oversight.

The Fed hasn't forgotten any of this, and may still wonder exactly what the business model of the new “Citicorp” is to be after Citi-Holdings is gone, and the Citigroup name dispensed with.

Investment banking (still 33% of recurring profits in 2013) is still a key business for Citigroup, even though it has dropped to sixth place in a ranking of originations of investment banking transactions that it led in 2004. As markets recover, the Fed may wonder if Citi will reappear in its old kick-ass, big-balance-sheet mode subjecting itself again to huge amounts of market risk in an effort to recover its previous rankings and share price.

The Fed may also worry that Citigroup is too-big-to-manage. Despite cutbacks, it still operates several different businesses in 100 countries and employees 250,000 people. Its activities in emerging market countries (24% of recurring profits) that operate through subsidiaries run by locals that report to local regulators have been problematic for Citigroup, HSBC and Standard Chartered in recent years as major fraud cases and instances of non-compliance with US and European money laundering rules have surfaced.

But the real story may be that the Fed, itself under new management, truly wants to be a different type of regulator -- one that is going to be strict, proactive and controlling. The post crisis environment certainly creates an expectation for such a regulator, one whose stress tests, for example, are taken seriously. Rejecting Citigroup, without much of an explanation, might be an indicator of this transition.

Indeed, the US government has held nothing back in demonstrating that the biggest banks should fear its powers. JP Morgan has learned this lesson from the Justice Department and other regulatory agencies over the past year.

The Fed also failed three subsidiaries of European banks, even though they too met the minimum capital requirements. This may have been a warning shot to make sure Europeans understood that their US operations have to be fully compliant with all facets of the new rules.

Maybe too, the Fed wants to send an additional, Thatcher-like, message to the ECB: “Don’t go wobbly on the European stress tests, Mario. If we can be tough so can you.” Maybe its time to fail a major European bank, if only to encourage the others.


About This Blog

Roy C. Smith

 Introducing: Banks and Markets


April 7, 2014

We are Roy C. Smith and Ingo Walter, two professors at the NYU Stern School of Business who have taught courses in Finance and Economics for more then twenty years.

Smith was a partner at Goldman, Sachs & Co. before crossing over into academics, later becoming the Kenneth Langone Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance. Walter, an Economist born in Germany, is Seymour Milstein Professor of Finance, Corporate Governance and Ethics, and a former Dean of Faculty at NYU Stern. Until recently, Walter was also Swiss Bank Corporation Professor of Economics at INSEAD, in Fontainbleau, France.

article_Ingo_Walter
Ingo Walter
We have co-authored a number of books about global banking and finance, including a textbook (Global Banking (now in its Third Edition, 2011), a book about ethical conduct on Wall Street (Street Smarts, 1997), one that predicted the impact of the Euro on financial markets, just as the Euro was introduced (High-Finance in the EuroZone, 2000), and Governing the Modern Corporation, 2006.

We have each written other books too, on subjects ranging from secret money on Switzerland, the origins of American capitalism, banking failures and recoveries in the 1980s and 1990s, universal banking, bank mergers and acquisitions. We have done a variety of OpEds and articles on these subjects as well.

We hope this blog will enable us to circulate OpEds on a variety of subjects related to contemporary issues related to economics, finance and markets to other people like us who are interested in these things and the capital markets industry is developing at a time of great change imposed by tighter government regulation, competition, technology and, yes, by market forces.

We call this blog Banks and Markets (its web address is Bank-o-Nomics.com because we couldn't get the name we wanted) but the subjects we will be commenting may range a bit father afield.

We expect to post periodically, not daily, once we get started.

Banks and Markets has a Facebook page too, so you can follow us there if you want to.