In Remembrance of Lehman Brothers
Paul H. Tice
Guest Contributor
Lehman Brothers,
the fourth largest U.S. investment bank, filed for bankruptcy protection on
September 15, 2008 to send a message to the markets. Eight years later, we are still struggling to
decode the message and draw the proper lessons from that catastrophic event.
Much has been
written and said about the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers over the intervening
years, including government inquiries, forensic reports and countless case
studies. Yet for all this accumulated body of work, we still seem to be missing
some of the basic take-away points.
The first Lehman
lesson should be an obvious one: in the modern age of integrated global
finance, the bankruptcy of a major investment bank can never be orderly, much
less therapeutic for the markets. Lehman
Brothers still ranks as the largest U.S. corporate bankruptcy to date, with
$613 billion of total liabilities reported when it filed Chapter 11. When the firm collapsed, it touched off a
global financial crisis, seized up credit markets worldwide and deepened an
already-gathering U.S. recession.
The Lehman bankruptcy
estate is now readying its eleventh distribution of cash to creditors, with no
end in sight for the process. Along the
way, there has been an incredible destruction of economic value across the
financial sector, both in terms of spent time and legal costs.
And yet, under
the Dodd-Frank Act, it will be the same game plan going forward, with any future
failing financial firm to be resolved through an “orderly liquidation” process.
While all
systematically-important financial institutions must now have “living wills” in
place, these confidential company directives are more placebo than panacea, and
do not abrogate the need for regulatory support and consistency to maintain liquid
and functioning financial markets during periods of stress.
Even with the
proper paperwork on file, there is little reason to expect different results
the next go-round, especially in a repeat scenario of 2008 when a series of
major bank bankruptcies would need to be orchestrated in the midst of a systemic
crisis caused by a market-specific trigger.
Second, while
some have argued for the re-instatement of the Glass-Steagall Act, the housing of securities underwriting and trading
activities in larger commercial banks actually represents a source of stability
for the financial system, not the reverse.
Most of the industry players that disappeared along
with Lehman in 2008 were stand-alone investment banks with smaller balance
sheets that were more exposed to mark-to-market accounting, due to their large
trading books and collateralized agreements. When these investment banks ran into trouble, the solution was to
simply merge them with their stronger commercial bank brethren, accelerating an
industry consolidation that started back in the 1990s. With or without public financial support,
such government-facilitated combinations were preferable to the Lehman Chapter
11 alternative.
Third, it was
not a lack of regulations on the books, but rather regulatory uncertainty and a
lack of supervisory oversight, that contributed to the 2008 financial crisis,
both before and after Lehman’s bankruptcy filing.
Nonetheless, the
Dodd-Frank Act, with its companion Volcker Rule, has mandated a total of 390
new rulemakings for the financial sector.
Of this target, 274 major rules or 70% had been finalized by July 2016, according
to the latest progress report prepared by Davis Polk. Six years into it, Dodd-Frank has added
roughly $36 billion of regulatory costs and 74 million man-hours in paperwork
filing for the industry, based on numbers compiled by the American Action
Forum.
While some
regulatory changes have been positive—notably, central clearing requirements
for credit derivatives—Wall Street banks are now consumed with legal compliance,
as opposed to financial innovation, market-making and providing liquidity for
investors. In many ways, what has
happened to the financial sector post-crisis is similar to the regulatory takeover
of the U.S. electricity sector during the 1930s, with banks now functioning as
the equivalent of public utilities. The
key difference, though, is that finance is much more complicated than just
keeping the lights on.
Lastly, the antidote for the weak corporate governance and poor
risk management demonstrated by Lehman Brothers and many of its peers in the
run-up to 2008 would include a series of simple prescriptions—such as less-compliant
boards, more-proactive auditors and improved balance sheet transparency—rather
than the wholesale elimination of all risk-taking.
Since 2008, Federal Reserve policy has distorted the pricing of all
risk assets, as interest rates have been kept too low for too long, undermining
fundamental trade conviction and positioning appetite and amplifying price
movements. These days, even a 25 basis point increase in interest rates from a
zero starting point is enough to paralyze the markets. Now, every extreme volatility event in the
markets is casually referred to as a “Lehman moment,” which shows how much memories
have faded over the past eight years.
As the industry currently stands, the likelihood of a recurrence
of the 2008 financial crisis is arguably very low, but at what cost? The U.S. economy continues to generate
sub-par growth, and few question whether a key contributing factor is a
moribund financial sector cowed by
compliance, averse to risk and struggling to retain talent due to artificially-suppressed
compensation levels. Given the stigma
attached to a career in finance these days, it is not surprising that the
number of finance majors coming out of business school has fallen off
dramatically in recent years.
When Lehman
Brothers collapsed, it also altered the course of an American presidential
election, and changed the direction of this country. Since then, Wall Street has been pitted
against Main Street, and bi-partisan criticism of Wall Street banks has devolved
into antipathy towards big business and wealthy Americans. More recently, it has led to atavistic
attacks on free trade and global markets and charges that the entire U.S.
capitalist system is “rigged.”
All of which, at
some level, can be traced back to the failure to deal with the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers in a frank and open manner.
By not learning the proper lessons from Lehman and 2008, we remain stuck
re-litigating the past, unable to move on.
Something to
think about as everyone pauses today to remember where they were eight years
ago when the world’s financial markets stood still.
15 September 20167. Paul Tice is an
Executive-in-Residence at New York University’s Stern School of Business and spent
14 years of his Wall Street career at Lehman Brothers.
blocpower374U
ReplyDeleteI came to read about Rice’s opinion piece in WSJ on The Trouble with Biden’s Green Bank, where he decries the creation of a federal green bank to support sustainable, clean energy transition projects as it’ll come due for the American people . A recent Green Bank trend report shows the growing trend of these investments across 61 institutions in 36 countries. In this blogpost, Rice says that the legislation landscape from 2008 crisis orchestrated due to improper oversight by Lehman Brothers is too complicated, over-reaching and had made the investment sector risk averse. It’s been 5 years between this blogpost and the WSJ oped but his inclinations towards laissez-faire free market attitudes is highlighted in these two posts. But his competing arguments of trying to make the markets less risk averse (in 2016 post by removing compliance protocols etc) and reducing federal green bank investments (in 2021 WSJ post cause the necessary underwriting process for green banks isn’t investment grade yet) even when the latter are innovative federal + market green infrastructure drives needed to push the economy into a more diverse investment portfolio.
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