Wednesday, August 24, 2016

What’s Next for Morgan Stanley?




By Brad Hintz and Roy C. Smith

ValueAct’s acquisition of a 2% stake in Morgan Stanley is the first, overdue appearance of an activist hedge fund on the global banking scene. What can it hope to accomplish?
ValueAct has a long history of being a “friendly” activist that studies troubled industry situations and seeks to “work with” management and boards to make useful improvements. In this case, ValueAct has expressed confidence in chief executive James Gorman and the management team and notes that at 70% of book value, its Morgan Stanley investment has been made at an attractive price no matter what happens.
But there has to be more to the ValueAct story than a simple value play. Morgan Stanley’s price to book valuation is low, but so is its return on equity. In 2015, the firm delivered an ROE of 6.5%, which was 7.9% less than its cost of equity capital. And in its most recent quarter, returns were still 6.8% below a reasonable equity return.
Indeed, since 2008 Morgan Stanley’s return on equity has averaged 7.1% below its cost of equity. This is because the company’s beta – an important factor in determining its cost of capital – has remained stubbornly high (>2.0) despite Gorman’s successful strategic transformation and de-risking of the firm’s business model.
Morgan Stanley acquired the Smith Barney retail brokerage business from Citigroup in 2010. Today, about half of Morgan Stanley’s revenue stream is from capital markets, and half is from wealth management and asset management. Its struggling fixed income unit has been triaged and its balance sheet trimmed. Morgan Stanley has maintained leading shares in M&A advisory and equity underwriting and increased its share of the institutional equity trading market. The separate Dean Witter, Morgan Stanley, and Smith Barney retail units have been integrated and margins in the wealth management business are now averaging more than 22%. The company’s capital ratios have been strengthened and management has stated that the firm is committed to returning capital through dividends (2.6% yield) and sizeable stock repurchases.
Altogether, Morgan Stanley has a good story. But, based on the high beta of its stock, the equity market appears skeptical. Or, put another way, the strategic changes have not been enough to deliver acceptable levels of profitability given the perception of risks associated with the capital markets business that the firm has retained.
The capital markets businesses of all the large banks have been struggling to deliver reasonable returns since 2009. Their continuing regulatory burdens and litigation challenges have led some investors to question their long-term economic viability. Morgan Stanley investors’ concerns focus mainly on the capital markets business, which is heavily dependent on trading units that require a massive balance sheet (roughly $800 billion of assets). Further, capital markets activities must squeeze through a new regulatory labyrinth of capital reserves, operating restrictions, and exceptional levels of oversight that constrain profits significantly.
ValueAct has not said what it hopes to accomplish with its investment, but a change in business mix seems likely. Morgan Stanley’s capital markets business consumes about 60% of the firm’s capital, and 35% of its revenues are from trading that drags down returns.
But capital markets require a mix of activities with different profit margins. Equity new issues and mergers and acquisitions advisory historically have generated high margins (approximately 40% pretax), but debt capital markets and institutional equity execution have generated relatively low margins (6% and 15% respectively). Fixed income sales and trading generate 18% to 20% pretax margins but require large capital levels to support market-making activities, and can be very volatile.
The low-hanging fruit for any activist investor is to slash or even shutter the highly capital intensive, low ROE trading units and return the capital to shareholders. Certainly if Morgan Stanley could grow its low risk and low capital intensity wealth and asset management units, while shrinking the capital-intensive businesses, ROE would improve.
Capital markets products and services are tied together through multiple client relationships across product lines. Institutional clients demand full-service offerings. Security issuers often demand medium-term note programs and low-margin debt capital market services as quid pro quo for the promise of high-margin engagements.
These inter-business connections make changing or exiting businesses such as institutional equities or fixed income trading a risky proposition for a major investment bank. This is especially true if the bank’s major competitors are firms like JP Morgan or Goldman Sachs that are not reducing capital market services.
Given these considerations, the most that ValueAct may be able to achieve is to “prune” the market-making business units hard. UBS has been successfully pursuing this strategy, thus freeing capital and reducing compensation expenses. Such a strategy at Morgan Stanley, if believed by investors, could reduce the beta of the firm and substantially reduce its cost of equity capital. This could allow Morgan’s net return on equity to recover to a much more viable positive number.
Indeed, ValueAct may see the real prize to be in de-risking the firm sufficiently to escape designation as a “systemically important financial institution” (SIFI), the real cause of the stresses on Morgan’s existing business model. (Lazard Frères, a leading M&A firm that is not a SIFI, trades at four times book value). The regulatory burden on SIFIs is very high and costly, and because of high capital thresholds and the unpredictable nature of stress tests, it has become very difficult for all SIFIs to establish a viable long-term business model within permitted areas of operations.
Avoiding this burden as a result of eliminating trading might recapture a great deal of market value, but, even though MetLife has successfully appealed against its SIFI designation, and GE Capital has had its repealed because it broke up the firm, there has been absolutely no indication that such a move would be acceptable to the Financial Stability Oversight Council or the Federal Reserve in the foreseeable future.
But we welcome ValueAct on to the scene. After eight years of underperformance, Morgan Stanley (and the rest of the industry) needs out-of-the-box thinking and external pressure to help accelerate and complete the transition of the firm from what it was before the crisis to what it needs to be in the future.

Published in eFinancial News, Aug. 24, 2016

Saturday, August 6, 2016

More on the Net Regulatory Burden


by Roy C. Smith 

 

The Wall Street Journal today has an editorial entitled "The All-Time Regulation Record" quoting  a forthcoming report prepared by Sam Batkins of the American Action Forum, a right-of-center nonpartisan think-tank, that illustrates the continuing problem of net regulatory burden described in our post on July 5th ("Economic Growth and Regulatory Relief").

(See: http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-all-time-regulation-record-1470435716)

The Batkins report, based on data supplied by federal agencies, concludes that the Obama Administration has issued a record-setting 600 "major" rules since taking office, with perhaps 50 more to come. A major rule is one that imposes regulatory costs of more than $100 million.  Altogether, Mr. Batkins estimates these rules will cost up to $743 billion, or 4.2% of GDP, and will require nearly 200 million hours a year for compliance. Cumulatively, the WSJ estimates that this regulatory burden costs the US economy, now stuck in a seemingly endless low growth mode, about 1%-2% of its annual rate of growth.

Certainly some of this regulatory burden is beneficial and necessary. But certainly too, a lot of it is not. And as oblivious of the net regulatory burden as the Obama team may be, the trend towards excessive regulation did not start with it. The George W. Bush Administration provided nearly 500 major rules during its eight year term.  There is little evidence of rigorous cost-benefit analyses being applied to either of these teams' regulatory agenda. 

Yet voters in a crucial presidential election in November hear little of this. Both candidates have promised all kinds of things that would require considerable additions to the net regulatory burden if passed by Congress, and, if not, the candidates would seek to deliver them instead through executive orders.

We seem to be getting close to a point where Americans will have to choose between growth and regulation, but so far, few seem to recognize the trade-offs needed to get the balance right.



Friday, July 29, 2016

Leveraging the Great Consensus on Infrastructure

Ingo Walter

Amid the hurly-burly of this year’s US political conventions and the gravitational pull of left against right there is one issue the two leading presidential candidates and their surrogates seem to agree on, the need to invest in America’s infrastructure - usually preceded by adjectives like aging, decrepit, obsolete and uncompetitive.

They are right. Research suggests that infrastructure is a key determinant of growth by providing the sinews of the economy that make everything else more efficient – consumption, production, investment, trade and government activity. As a result, the social benefits of infrastructure investments tend to far exceed what their direct users end up paying for them, and these valuable spillovers help explain their outsize impact on economic performance and growth.

Both major candidates’ allegiance to the beleaguered “middle class” makes serious infrastructure investments doubly attractive. The benefits tend to be spread widely and not concentrated at the top of the wealth and income pyramid. They might even be called “progressive.” Greenfield and brownfield projects employ a lot of well-paid people across the skills spectrum – from architects and structural engineers to steelworkers and stonemasons - jobs that are impossible to outsource abroad. And the multiplier-effects across the rest of the economy, from housing construction to pickup trucks and sandwich lunches, are impressive.

So what could be better? Stimulating demand while creating the basis for greater near-term efficiency and long-term growth across the whole economy, all while creating income and welfare gains for the general population in a way that broadens income distribution. And all this at a time when the cost of capital is at an all-time low, inflation is a distant memory and there seems to be ample excess capacity in key sectors. Of course, there are a few problems.

Major infrastructure projects completed on time and on budget in China or France would be almost unthinkable in the United States today, where even the redevelopment of obsolete and sometimes dangerous infrastructure can involve years of public debate, regulatory approvals, environmental impact statements, litigation and other blockages. If infrastructure is as important as the candidates seem to think, a significant part of the US growth slowdown during the last decade could be attributed to all manner of special interests scrapping over slices of a stagnant pizza rather than pouring political and economic capital into baking a bigger pie and sharing the gains.

The 1956 Eisenhower Interstate Highway System was arguably the sole post-war “grand design” infrastructure project. American infrastructure development today seems largely decentralized and localized with federal “program” support, along with commercial projects undertaken in the private sector such as rail lines and electric power distribution. At the state and local level, in turn, the main stumbling block seems to be the long-term focus required for infrastructure and the short-term focus of the electoral cycle. Can the current political consensus among presidential contenders recreate the national will that made possible the transformative Interstate initiative?

And then there’s the financing. Infrastructure is uniquely vulnerable to the “free rider” problem. “Let the other guy pay. I’ll benefit anyway since it’s so hard to exclude my use, either gratis or at a price way below cost.” So what if another state or local infrastructure bond issue fails?

But there’s plenty of hope. Advanced technologies and “big data,” micro-metering that makes possible usage charges which can more accurately capture benefits and costs, and similar innovations are already being applied or are just over the horizon. Before you know it, corralling the free riders will make possible sustainable infrastructure finance in many sectors. And once this happens, the burden on public finance will ease and, in a yield-hungry environment infrastructure revenue bonds will become a darling of institutional investors like pension funds and insurance companies.

Whereas most infrastructure finance is executed in the public sector today, there is much to be said for the private sector, which already dominates oil pipelines, electric power generation, hospitals and the like. From airports to toll roads, from bridges and tunnels to ocean terminals, there is no reason, other than lack of political will, why world-class infrastructure cannot designed, constructed, operated and financed mainly in the private sector.

Available evidence suggests that stocks of infrastructure project sponsors in recent decades have outperformed other asset classes like real estate, with the added benefit of low correlations to the major indexes – therefore good portfolio diversification value. And bank lending (the mainstay of front-end financing for infrastructure projects) has bounced back nicely from the financial crisis, even as infrastructure bonds with investment-grade ratings show good potential for the future once the markets for these instruments mature.


Bottom line: Undecided or dismayed voters today can find cheer in something they usually don’t think much about. Infrastructure. It won’t get them out in the streets or standing on their seats doing fist-bumps. But it’s a rare “sweet spot.” If the candidates walk the talk and read their Eisenhower, there’s something going on here that will affect voters more than they realize.

Tuesday, July 5, 2016

Economic Growth and Regulatory Relief



by Roy C. Smith and Ingo Walter

Low rates of economic growth today seem to pervade the world economy. Few in China, Japan and emerging markets are happy with their economies’ performance. Politically, Brexit appeared to center on migration issues, but British voters have long chafed at the EU’s lack of economic growth and excess of regulatory micromanagement from Brussels. Many “leave” voters thought they’d be better off avoiding the stifling bureaucracy and simply playing by the rules of global trade as the US, China and other non-EU members do.

 But US growth has also fallen short, accounting for much of the skepticism and mistrust of the voting public. So far, the presidential campaign has been depressingly deficient in drawing-out the economic policy issues that will have a far bigger effect on American lives than almost anything else debated by the candidates.

Growth issues are crucial. Since 2000 U.S. GDP growth has averaged less than 2% per year, and seems to be stuck there for the foreseeable future. The average growth rate over the previous 50 years was about 3.5%. That difference, compounded over the years, is enormous. It is reflected in lower real per-capita income, private sector capital spending, renewal and new investment in infrastructure, productivity improvements, and other important roots of economic performance.

Meanwhile, the funds available to pay for federal, state and local pensions and the various social programs that most Americans expect their government to provide as “entitlements” are running out. Without faster growth they will require drastic changes. And the career prospects and the prosperity of future generations worry many American parents long accustomed to making progress from one generation to the next.

No wonder the voters are testy, and receptive to populist pitches to create major changes and start over.

Americans should be asking the candidates “Where’s the growth?” and “How are we going to get it back?” Without it, the U.S. will confront an economic future much like continental Europe and Japan. Standards of living may seem fine for the time being, but beneath the surface prosperity the prospective future wellbeing of the citizenry, the nation’s vitality and its global standing are gradually dissipating.

During the grueling primary season the surviving presidential candidates have invariably paid lip service to growth idling well below its potential, and the need to somehow hit the “reset” button. And yet there have been no coherent roadmaps for how this can be done.

Hillary Clinton and the Democrats, pushed hard to the left by Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, are focusing their campaign on re-slicing the economic pie by progressively alleviating “income inequality” through direct intervention such as trade protectionism, increasing the minimum wage, easing student-loan debt, tougher regulation of banks, and boosting taxes on hedge fund managers and others among the rich. The trouble is there’s no free lunch, and the policies tabled so far are more likely to shrink the pie than to enlarge it, and in the meantime, rival political factions will fight viciously over the shrinking slices.

One early presidential candidate, Jeb Bush, was alone in putting forward a plan to restore U.S. growth to a 4% level and jettison the “new normal” of 2% that has seemed to be acceptable to the Obama administration.  His plan included a major tax reforms, especially cuts for the middle class, to be paid for by eliminating some deductions and benefits provided to industry and wealthy individuals. The Bush plan was straight out of the old Republican playbook that has been in place since the Reagan era, but nevertheless had support from credible economists. The only plan on the table was cast aside along with Mr. Bush when the Trump juggernaut rolled over him.

Trump’s anti-trade economic plan – one that also offers major tax cuts but no changes in entitlement programs – has little credibility and omits the specifics needed for proper evaluation.  Republican voters will have to take it on faith that their party’s legacy economic policies will survive in a Trump presidency. But he has not signed on to these policies and up to now has proven to be  fundamentally unpredictable.

The basic Republican package – cut taxes to encourage consumption and investment - paying for it through borrowing if Congress fails to enact spending cuts – admittedly comes with a big increase in the federal budget deficit. That deficit, however, is now down to about 2.5% of GDP (compared to 10% in 2009), so there is some headroom in a one-off effort to kick-start the U.S. growth engine.

The Democratic plan differs mainly in where taxes should be cut and raised, with a “progressive” slant, making it more likely to boost the U.S. fiscal deficit over the longer term. Probably Congressional gridlock will prevent the Democrats from enacting their plans unless they can take control of the House of Representatives (possible, but not likely). Nor will Republicans be able to do much to enact their own programs without controlling sixty votes in the Senate (also possible, but not likely).

So it matters less what the candidates say they want to do than what they may actually be able do, mainly through their executive powers.

A president can wield significant economic power through regulation and  enforcement, and support and encouragement of the private sector (or not)   because federal regulation is now so pervasive and mostly relies on rules written by civil servants in the various administrative agencies.

Three recent studies shed some light on the cost of regulation in the U.S. A report by James Gattuso and Diane Katz of the Heritage Foundation (2016), found that in the first seven years of the Obama Administration new federal regulations reached a cumulative annual cost to the private sector of $108 billion, with the federal government spending additional $57 billion on enforcement. This represents “an unparalleled expansion of the regulatory state,” the authors claim.

            Another study by Bentley Coffey, Patrick McLaughlin and Pietro Peretto for the Mercatus Center at George Mason University (2013) estimated that the cumulative cost of U.S. regulation across 22 industries from 1977 to 2012 caused by “the distortion of investment choices that lead to innovation” amounted to an average annual reduction of the U.S. economic growth rate by 0.8%. The study concluded that if regulation had been held at constant levels since 1980, the U.S. economy by 2012 would have been 25% larger.

And a study by Mark Perry at The American Enterprise Institute (2013), concluded that the aggregate economic cost of regulation in the US since 1949 -- i.e., the total cost of compliance and reduced investment -- led to a 2% average annual reduction in U.S. GDP growth.

There are many other studies like this, including one cited recently by Speaker Paul Ryan, that point to the high residual drag on economic growth caused by regulation. Indeed, in 1993 the Clinton Administration established the National Partnership for Reinventing Government aimed specifically at cutting federal regulatory costs.

Of course, regulation can have value to individuals, businesses and American economy generally.  It protects the system against fraud, dangerous products, monopolies and various other forms of exploitation. It aims to make markets for goods and services fairer and more competitive.

Nevertheless, several studies including one by the Office of Management and Budget, note that the benefits of regulation have to be subtracted from their costs to obtain a meaningful idea of the “net regulatory burden” (NRB) imposed on the economy. The argument is that the NRB in the U.S. has grown to a level where it seriously damages growth and constrains the effectiveness of pro-growth policies regardless which political party is in power.

This “excess” regulation involves an economic burden through obsolete, ineffective, impractical, duplicative, market-distorting requirements that impact private-sector activities. NRB is certainly not entirely responsible for the drag on U.S. economic growth. But it is probably responsible for a good deal of it, and may be the most fixable in a new administration.

There seems to be a lot that can be pared-away. The Gattuso and Katz study points out that a great deal of new regulation (or stricter enforcement of existing rules) has been launched in the Obama years through the powers of federal agencies. Although some of these “executive authorities” have been challenged in court, few have been overturned.

Some of the principal launchers have been the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Energy, the Anti-trust Division of the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Federal Communications Commission, the Financial Stability Oversight Council, the SEC, the CFTC, the FDIC, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the Department of Homeland Security.

Most of this new regulation appears to have been motivated politically and ideologically, and not subjected to Congressional approval or independent economic review. Canceling, simplifying and reducing the accumulated regulatory underbrush could release considerable economic energy to help restore growth, and is doable even with persistent Congressional dysfunction.

During its term in office, the Obama Administration also became increasingly unfriendly to business – it has blamed the financial crisis of 2008 on greedy businessmen and their Republican supporters instead of the more complex confluence of factors actually responsible. That attitude may have affected consumer confidence, fears of further layoffs and reduced appetite among businesses, particularly small ones, for investing for the future.

Obama’s regulation-inducing pessimism isn’t easy to explain politically, given that 85% of all working Americans are employed in the private sector. It would seem to make more sense for politicians to back an initiative that could instead unlock pro-growth potential.

It is possible that President Hillary Clinton would turn her back on the Obama regulatory policies, but at this point the likelihood of her championing a de-regulation turnaround seems low. President Trump - if properly advised and focused - might do so, but how such an effort under his control would turn out is impossible to predict.

In most presidential campaigns, the candidates move towards the center after gaining their nominations.  After all, in January 2016 a Gallup Poll reported that 42 percent of all voters are now self-declared independents (i.e., moderates) that do not respond to the extreme positions typical of primary campaigns in which only 17% of voters participated in 2016. Clinton, however, may not bother to shift towards the center if Trump continues to drop in the polls, more because of his extreme personality than his extreme positions.

Perhaps the best that can be said for Clinton’s presumptive economic policy directions is that, based on her pragmatic Clintonian family DNA (and her own wealth accumulated since Bill left office), she may at heart be a moderate Republican dressed up in Democrat clothing.

And the best that can be said for Trump is that, if elected, he will have revealed a powerful political majority that truly wants radical change in areas that affect the pocketbooks of average Americans. If that cohort is as large as Trump hopes it is, then he will have license to do radical things, whatever they might be. Some of these things, we assume, would be pro-business.

But if it turns out not to be large enough to elect Trump, then we are in Hillary’s hands. Will those hands be more Obaman than Clintonian?  Much of future growth hangs in the balance.

Monday, June 27, 2016

Brexit Has Left a Big Mess, but the City of London will be Fine.


By Roy C. Smith

For years successive UK governments have fought the EU to protect the freedom of the City’s financial markets. Now they won’t have to.
Yes, we know that the unexpected Brexit vote has thrown much into confusion, to be sorted out messily over an uncertain period of time, but the effects on the City after the smoke clears are likely to be more beneficial than not.
Indeed, the City has been around a lot longer than the EU, and its generally unregulated Euromarket, born in the 1960s, has evolved into the world’s largest capital market for global corporations, banks and governments, generating $4 trillion of new issues of debt and equity in 2015 as compared to less than $3 trillion in the USA.
Not much of this volume was British, of course; the markets have evolved to what and where they are because they have attracted others to use them. Over many generations, London, unlike any other European city, has learned to appreciate the value of low tax rates and a light regulatory touch that favors competitive free-market pricing of financial assets for issuers and investors from all over the world.
It has also accumulated a large financial talent pool with an accompanying infrastructure. London markets in securities, foreign exchange, commodities, and derivatives are hard wired into counterparts in New York, Toyko, Hong Kong and elsewhere to present a seamless, high-tech global trading environment in financial instruments of all kinds. These markets also serve as a hub for intra-European trading, where local European markets have benefitted by increasingly being integrated into the Euromarkets.
According to a recent McKinsey report, the global value of all outstanding securities in the world in 2015 was approximately $300 trillion, more than 3% of world GDP. The London-based markets account for a major chunk of this sum.
Since its beginning, the EU has been distrustful of the power of global financial markets, and since the 2008 crisis has attempted to impose significant limits on them. As the UK markets are the largest in Europe, they are the most affected by these ideas.
British governments have blocked or opted out of many of these efforts, but some still remain, in one form or another.
These include limits on bonuses paid to bankers, the European Banking Authority’s inclusion of British banks in its oversight and regulatory grasp, the applicability of a Financial Transaction Tax (which has been delayed, if not undone, with help from other EU member countries), and a proposal from the ECB to force clearing houses used by EU members to be located in continental Europe. Other such rules could be introduced in the future.
Being Out, of course, means not having to worry about these incursions any longer. But being Out also means the EU might enact other anti-market regulations that might require, as an extreme example, that EU issuers and investors only use EU regulated markets.  That would be a serious self-injuring mistake that likely would create ways around the rules, or encourage other member countries to object, but even so, British firms should still be able to participate in such transactions.  
That is because, as American firms have realized, under the Single Market Act, anyone can set up a subsidiary in the EU to do its business there with all EU membership benefits. Being outside the EU has not hurt US global capital market firms, which have a dominant share of the Euro market business. Though this may mean some legal reorganizing and shift of personnel to get passporting right, there is little reason for British firms to think they might not be able to adapt effective platforms to preserve their market shares.
In any case, it’s too early to worry. The UK has to serve official notice of its intention to withdraw, which may take several more months to do, and then there is a two-year negotiation period (which can be extended) during which competent officials try to reach a sensible agreement aligned with their own interests out of the public eye.
They will be negotiating just how Out Britain is to be. Out like Norway with special trading rights, or like Switzerland, which has bi-lateral trade deals with most EU countries. That kind of Out might not be so bad.
In the meantime, Britain is still In and will l be in for several more years.

Friday, June 24, 2016

The Brexit Shock



By Roy C. Smith

A year ago it was Greece that everyone thought might leave, or be tossed out of the European Union.  Grexit never happened, but today Brexit did through a 52-48 percent referendum vote (with an amazing 72% turnout) in which only Scotland and the London region supported remaining in the EU.

Pollsters said the sentiment had changed in recent weeks to favor remaining in the EU, and yesterday markets soared as investors treated themselves to an early victory celebration. But the polls were badly wrong. Markets collapsed on the news this morning.

Prime Minister David Cameron will resign sometime soon but no one knows who the next Conservative Party leader will be, as Cameron’s inner circle all supported remaining and are probably not eligible.  Boris Johnson, the maverick former Mayor of London, who broke with the Conservatives to support leaving, said the referendum provided Britain with a “glorious opportunity” to take control of its economy and its borders.

Donald Trump, visiting one of his golf courses in the UK at the time, agreed with Johnson said Britain had done the right thing.

Former Labour Party Prime Minister Tony Blair, who strongly supported remaining, said he though people believed the referendum offered an opportunity for a “protest vote,” when in fact it was instead a very important “decision vote.”  Referendums can be dangerous when voters get things confused.

Nicola Sturgeon, head of the Scottish Nationalist Party that lost a referendum vote in 2014 on leaving the UK, said a new Scottish vote would now be necessary.  The Scot Nats are the third largest political party in the UK.

Right wing politicians in several European countries claimed that referendum votes in their countries would likely follow the British example, causing elected leaders to worry about further defection among the (now) 27 remaining EU members. 

But out is out. Britain will now have to begin a two-year negotiation with the EU, under the never tested Article 50 for an orderly withdrawal. They will argue over future tariffs and market access. The EU doesn’t want to make it too easy, for fear others will follow the UK out the door, but they don’t want to make it too hard either because they still want the British economy linked to theirs.  But to do this the UK has to field a team of true-believing negotiators, and that may require another general election.

The economic argument for Brexit was that cut free of its obligations to the EU (social and economic policies more left than the UK would prefer), the UK could make its own laws and shape its own destiny and be better off.  But, leaving means that UK’s exports to the EU (44% of total exports) would be subject to tariffs and therefore more costly, and new investment in the country (especially by foreign companies) would likely fall off with diminished access to European markets.  A weaker pound (it fell 7.3% on the news) would balance some of this stuff, but whether Britain actually ends up better off will depend on how effectively it can change its own laws to boost its economy as the leavers expect it to do.

This will not be easy. Low growth and fears about job losses have driven economic policy in the UK, the EU and the US (the UK growth rate has averaged 2%, and unemployment 6.5% since 2010, but unemployment is now 5%). Many economists forecast a 3-4% recession as a result of the vote.

Or, as David Brady, a Stanford political scientist has said “no party, country or leader has discovered the path to achieve economic growth while mitigating the ills that go with it. “ It is a difficult time for tough-love market economics that threaten to make things worse in order for them to get better over the longer term.

There is also a lot of uncertainty over how the vote will affect the City of London, the longstanding financial center of the EU. There may be some job shifts to other European cities, but the talent and infrastructure of the London markets is likely to survive, and perhaps be made more competitive by its ability to escape the many EU rules it dislikes.

The politics of the thing, however, ultimately may be the more important issue for Britain. Leaving essentially is a repudiation of its old neighborhood, which clumsily or not has forged a historically unprecedented economic confederation of nations to provide economic prosperity and political security for a region of the world that had little of it for the first 50 years of the 20th Century. Confederations are at best unwieldy and fragile alliances, but the EU, now with a pre-Brexit population of 507 million is the world’s largest economic marketplace (GDP of $18.5 trillion). The UK is Europe’s second largest economy (GDP of $2.9 trillion) and the second largest country by population (64 million).

For the EU to survive it has to strengthen itself as it grows and this requires the skillful attention of national political leaders from the largest countries. The UK has been an important dissenter (along with a few other countries that looked to the UK for leadership on certain issues) that has brought a market-oriented viewpoint to a group that definitely needed, but resisted it.

Now this voice will be absent, Britain’s influential role in Europe will be lost, and Great Britain may slip back to being Little England.     


Monday, June 13, 2016

Fifty Years of Extraordinary Change


By Roy C. Smith
Last week I attended the 50th reunion of my class at Harvard Business School. There were 650 who graduated, 120 have died, and of the rest, 340 (including many wives) attended the reunion. There were only six women in our class. 
We were told that in 1966 about 6,000 MBA degrees were awarded in the US (almost none anywhere else) – now it’s about 200,000 in the US and a large number abroad. Most of the core courses of our day are still taught, but there are fewer of them and more electives.
We were trained to be managers of large manufacturing corporations (“masters of business administrator”), but by the time of our 25th reunion, half the class identified themselves in a survey as being self-employed, working in small businesses or members of partnerships. Big business was not for them after all. 
Many of us were attracted to finance, which as an industry, probably changed more than any other during our 50 years.  Just as we were settling into our new careers (at an average starting salary of $11,000), the 1970s struck – the Dow Jones was the same in 1979 as it was in 1969, but the intervening years were plagued by inflation averaging nearly 8%. In 1971, the gold standard was abandoned; in 1973, the first oil crisis occurred; and in 1975 Wall Street was paralyzed by the forced introduction of negotiated commission rates. In 1979, the Volcker interest rate “shock” was engineered by the Fed to kill inflation  -- through this action led to the deep recession of 1981 and the S&L and Banking Crises of the 1980s.
So, for the first fifteen years or so, financial careers might have seemed pretty bleak, but out of all the difficulties of the 1970s came, a wave of innovations and a relaxation of competitive rigidities that enabled many financial firms to grow and prosper. Securitization, LBOs, junk bonds and derivatives were invented; new SEC rules such as shelf-registration allowed bankers to bid for business normally tied to “exclusive” relationships with other bankers.  The Eurobond market opened up and globalization of capital sources and investment opportunities abounded, especially in “emerging market” countries that previously had been considered as below the standards required to use capital markets.  
The world changed too. In 1979 Deng Xiaoping began China’s economic transformation; Margaret Thatcher brought “privatization” (of government owned businesses) and free-market policies to the UK. The EU was formed and the euro introduced, the Berlin Wall fell and the USSR voted itself out of business. First Japan, then China developed into Asian superpowers.
It wasn’t all easy – there were periodic financial crises along the way, but market economics prevailed and before we knew it, half the world’s population had bloodlessly changed their economic systems from ones oriented to socialist principles to capitalistic ones. And, the period from 1950 to the present became the longest uninterrupted time of peace and prosperity in Europe, North America, Russia, and China in modern history.
By 2016, global financial market capitalization was $300 trillion (over 3% of world GDP) and capable of generating market forces beyond the capability of any government to contain. In 1966, global market capitalization was well less than $1 trillion. In 2016, daily trading in foreign exchange was $5.3 trillion; in 1966 it was lass than $25 billion. In 2016 world trade was 33% of world GDP; in 1966 it was about 2%.
The daily volume of trading on the NY Stock Exchange was about 2 billion shares in 2016, up from 9 million in 1966; commissions had been reduced from about 1% of trade value to only 2-3 cents per share, but the NYSE’s share of trading in listed stocks fell to less than 20% as new technologies and trading platforms were introduced. 
Today, the cost of capital is largely determined by capital market activity; it is lower and more users have access to it than at any time in world history. Powerful economic linkages, and the extraordinary acceptance of markets (as judged by their use) despite some continuing political objections, leads us to believe that the system of market economics by which the world governs itself is here to stay.   
The firm I joined in 1966, Goldman Sachs, then had about 20 partners, with capital of about $20 million, and employed about 500 people. Fifty years later, Goldman’s public market capitalization is $62 billion and it employs 34,000. Still, the market value of the firm is about 3000 times greater than in 1966 but its headcount is only 85 times greater, which demonstrates the importance of computer and other technologies to all financial firms.
In 1966, Goldman Sachs had no foreign offices at all; today it has 61, 33 of which are in emerging market countries.
Despite all this growth in the industry, the fifteen largest US commercial and investment banks of 1966 have essentially disappeared – all but one (Goldman Sachs) have been acquired by other firms or failed, though some of the more prominent names have been retained. Today these thirty firms are boiled down into five – JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, all buy Goldman the survivors of many large mergers that erased all traces of the cultures of the original firms.
The same thing happened in the City of London – for the same reasons. Globalization, deregulation and technology pushed all of the clearing banks, merchant banks, jobbers and brokers into mergers that consolidated the industry into just a few hands.
All in all, the world of global economics and financial services has been transformed far beyond anything we might have imagined in 1966. We are back into a bleak period, like the 1970s, with lots of reorganization and restructuring to come, but what the next fifty years in economics and finance is probably just has unpredictable as it was fifty years ago.